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Theory and empirical evidence indicate that, in general, pay-for-performance (PFP) plans 
have positive effects on employee job performance (e.g., Gerhart & Fang, 2014; Gerhart & 
Rynes, 2003; Jenkins, Mitra, Gupta & Shaw, 1998; Lawler, 1971; Zenger, 1992). A common 
component of compensation systems, PFP plans are referred to as “pay that varies with some 
measure of individual or organizational performance” (Milkovich, Newman, & Gerhart, 2013, 
p.335). Theory attributes the influences of PFP plans to two broad sets of effects: incentive 
effects and sorting effects (Cadsby, Song, & Tapon, 2007; Gerhart & Fang, 2014; Gerhart & 
Milkovich, 1992; Gerhart & Rynes, 2003; Gerhart, Rynes, & Fulmer, 2009; Rynes, Gerhart, & 
Parks, 2005). Incentive effects represent the influence of PFP plans through employee 
motivation, based on the premise that PFP plans can increase employee motivation and hence 
employee performance. Sorting effects alter the composition of the workforce, in that PFP plans 
can affect the quality of workers who apply for jobs (Lazear, 1986; Rynes et al., 2005) and the 
performance level of those leaving the organization (Salamin & Hom, 2005; Shaw & Gupta, 
2007; Trevor, Gerhart, & Boudreau, 1997). While there are still some examples of ineffective 
PFP plans (e.g., Beer & Cannon, 2004; Kahn & Sherer, 1990; Lawler, 2000; Pearce, Stevenson, 
& Perry, 1985; Pfeffer, 1998), the preponderance of evidence shows that PFP plans have positive 
effects (cf., Gerhart & Fang, 2014; Gerhart et al., 2009). Yet, even with a substantial body of 
research discussing the effects of particular PFP interventions, PFP research has typically failed 
to consider the complex, multi-plan environments in which many organizations invest and many 
employees face (Gerhart et al., 2009; Rynes et al., 2005). This lack of consideration of more 
multifaceted environments presents a theoretical gap for understanding and testing how relevant 
PFP theories apply in more complex environments, and a practical gap for organizations needing 
to predict the sort of effects they should expect from their multi-plan environments. 
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While the literature on PFP plans is quite extensive (for reviews, see Gerhart & Fang, 
2014; Gerhart et al., 2009; Guthrie, 2007; Rynes et al., 2005), prior PFP research is largely based 
on specific examinations of individual PFP plans. Most studies examine a single form of PFP at 
a time, particularly in laboratory studies (e.g., Bandiera, Barankay, & Rasul, 2007; Cadsby et al., 
2007; Eisenberger, Rhoades, & Cameron, 1999; Kwong & Wong, 2014), but also in 
organizational settings (e.g., Banker, Lee, Potter, & Srinivasan, 1996, 2001; Dunford, Boudreau, 
& Boswell, 2005; Eisenberger et al., 1999; Pearce et al., 1985; Schaubroeck, Shaw, Duffy, & 
Mitra, 2008). Other work provides only broad overviews of PFP plans’ effects, such as in 
strategic HR management research which typically asks general questions about the extent to 
which employees are covered by PFP (e.g., Bhattacharya, Gibson, & Doty, 2005; Delery & 
Doty, 1996; Gerhart & Milkovich, 1992; Toh, Morgeson, & Campion, 2008; Wright, Gardner, 
Moynihan, & Allen, 2005). This previous work has certainly been valuable for providing 
information on the nature of PFP effects; however, the generalizability of theory and findings 
from single-plan focal studies to multi-plan environments is questionable. 
Many companies use multiple types of PFP simultaneously (Cohen, 2011; Gerhart  & 
Fang, 2014; Gerhart, et al., 2009; Rynes et al., 2005). A 2010 WorldatWork Survey showed that 
92% of companies use merit raises, 80% provide some form of individual-based variable pay 
program (not including sales commissions or merit raises), and 57% use some sort of 
performance-sharing plan. The same survey conducted in 2012 (WorldatWork, 2012) showed 
this to be an increasing trend, with 95% offering merit pay, 84% with some form of individual-
based variable pay program, and 58% using some form of performance-sharing. While these 
surveys do not explicitly report the number of different incentive plans covering the same 
employees, mathematically, we can extrapolate that at least three-quarters of companies use at 
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least two forms of PFP, and over one quarter are simultaneously using three different PFP plans. 
Despite this prevalent complexity, though, there is minimal research considering the relative 
effectiveness of different PFP plans. 
Studying PFP explicitly within the more complex environment of multiple PFP plans is 
critical in order to gain a better understanding of the relative effectiveness of different PFP 
forms. This study makes several contributions to our understanding of the effectiveness of PFP. 
First, this study considers multiple PFP plans simultaneously in multi-PFP plan environments. 
As noted above, most prior PFP research has considered a single PFP plan at a time, with it 
either being explicitly on a single plan, or unstated or unexplored if other PFP plans were 
operating simultaneously. It is unclear whether the predictions for individual PFP plans would 
generalize when it is explicitly known that other PFP plans are in operation. Furthermore, by 
applying PFP-related theories to the context of multiple PFP plans, we are examining a 
previously unexplored set of processes. It is not immediately evident what the effects of one PFP 
plan would be after controlling for the effects of other PFP plans, especially if the plans have 
related effects. This study extends PFP theories to consider the context of multiple PFP 
environments, where a portfolio of PFP plans cover employees. 
 Second, we contribute to the compensation literature by considering a gap between 
research and practice. Practically, we inform managers about how different PFP plans should be 
combined to increase employee performance in their organizations. It is clear that organizations 
are investing significant sums of money into multiple PFP forms (WorldatWork, 2010, 2012). 
With a sizable and growing number of employees being covered by two or more PFP plans, the 
lack of research on the relative effectiveness of such plans represents a notable gap in applicable 
research knowledge. While many argue that practitioners should take an evidence-based 
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approach to management policy (e.g., Rousseau, 2006; Rousseau & McCarthy, 2007), the lack of 
research addressing this specific situation represents another notable disconnect between 
research and practice (e.g., Cascio & Aguinis, 2008; Rynes, Giluk, & Brown, 2007), a particular 
problem in the area of compensation (Deadrick & Gibson, 2007; Rynes et al., 2007).  
The purpose of this paper is to apply existing PFP-relevant theory to differentiate 
between the effects of multiple PFP plans implemented simultaneously. We propose that a 
structural approach to understanding PFP plans can be used to form predictions on the relative 
effectiveness of different PFP plans for both incentive effects and sorting effects. By considering 
the specific characteristics of PFP plans, we can build theory to predict not just the general 
(directional) effects of PFP plans, but the relative effectiveness of plans. Furthermore, we can 
extend theory to the purpose of considering the simultaneous effects of multiple PFP plans. 
A STRUCTURAL APPROACH TO COMPENSATION PLANS  
Multiple types of PFP plans are often used through a combination of individual-based 
rewards (e.g., merit pay, lump-sum bonuses, and individual incentives) and/or group-based 
rewards (e.g., gain-sharing, profit sharing) (Gerhart et al., 2009; Milkovich et al., 2013). Every 
pay form has advantages and disadvantages, and these programs should differ in terms of both 
their incentive and sorting effects (Gerhart et al., 2009). What makes the study of compensation 
systems complex is that some aspects of PFP plans are different by definition (e.g., the reward is 
permanent, a one-time payment, or will take time before the reward is vested), while other 
characteristics can vary both within and across plan types (e.g., the strength of the relationship 
between performance and rewards, the award size). While prior use of theories regarding a single 
type of plan has typically yielded general predictions that PFP plans should have positive effects, 
such a holistic approach misses important characteristics of PFP plans and has questionable (or, 
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at least untested) generalizability to considering the simultaneous effects of multiple PFP plans. 
Based on pay plans’ mechanisms, we can differentiate between pay form and functionality, 
which can vary depending on different pay practices, thus delineating where hypotheses can be 
created based on the type of PFP being provided (i.e., pay plan definition, or form) and those 
based on the specific characteristics of the PFP plan (i.e., pay plan functionality). 
What’s In a Name Anyhow: The Effect of Different Pay Forms 
PFP plans come in a variety of forms, both in terms of the level of the performance 
metric (e.g., individual, team, unit) and the type of award it provides (e.g., recognition, non-
monetary awards, lump-sum cash awards, long-term incentives (LTI), and permanent pay 
increases). It is beyond the scope of any one study to contrast every potential PFP plan, and so 
we begin to address the noted gap in compensation research by considering three increasingly 
common PFP plans: merit pay, individual-based annual performance bonuses, and LTI. The first 
two of these are individually based and rewarded; the third is awarded to an individual and the 
size of the award depends in part on individual performance, but ultimately the value of the 
award depends on the overall market performance of the organization and vesting requirements.  
Merit pay is a form of reward in which individuals receive permanent pay increases (i.e., 
raises) as a function of their individual performance ratings (Heneman & Werner, 2005). The pay 
plan is usually based on an individual’s performance, assessed by an employee performance 
appraisal (Rynes et al., 2005; Schwab & Olson, 1990). Merit pay shares elements of both 
variable pay and fixed pay. It is variable in that the pay raise depends on individual performance, 
and thus new raises must be re-earned each year. It is fixed, though, in that any given merit raise 
increases base pay, and thus regardless of future performance levels, that new base pay will 
continue to be received even if performance changes (barring employee termination). 
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Bonus pay is a monetary reward given in addition to employees’ fixed compensation 
(Milkovich et al., 2013). Bonuses are ostensibly based on individual performance but do not 
increase employees’ base pay (Sturman & Short, 2000). This type of pay plan has been widely 
used in organizations to motivate employees’ performance, and surveys report that the popularity 
of bonus pay is increasing (cf., Sturman & Short, 2000; WorldatWork, 2012). Individual-based 
performance bonuses are attractive from the company’s perspective because the one-time cash 
rewards link pay to performance but do not increase fixed labor costs (Sturman & Short, 2000).  
LTI are rewards linked to a firm’s long-term growth as well as employee retention 
(Rousseau & Ho, 2000), generally in the form of cash or stocks (Moynihan, 2013). LTI allow a 
link between pay and performance, and like bonuses must be re-earned each year. Their rewards, 
however, are not immediate. Employees must wait until such awards are vested before their 
value can be used. While companies have historically offered LTI mostly to executives, many 
firms have begun applying LTI plans to non-executive employees (Core & Guay, 2001; National 
Center for Employee Ownership, 2012; Oyer & Schaefer, 2005). LTI plans are also PFP plans 
because the award itself may be a function of individual performance, and the value of the 
incentives change based on the performance of the organization. This helps tie employee rewards 
to overall organizational performance, although such PFP is no longer solely linked to individual 
performance. 
Getting What You Pay For: The Link Between Pay and Performance  
As reviewed above, a pay plan’s name reveals information about its’ award, but simply 
calling something a PFP plan does not necessarily mean it links pay with performance. A number 
of theories suggest that the strength of the PFP link will lead to beneficial incentive and sorting 
effects (Lambert, Larcker, & Weigelt, 1993); thus, the degree to which pay and performance are 
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linked is a critical characteristic of any PFP plan (Milkovich et al., 2013; Zenger, 1992). 
Expectancy theory proposes that employees make rational decisions based on the 
characteristics of the incentives they are facing (Bartol & Durham, 2000; Fusilier, Ganster, & 
Middlemist, 1984; Vroom, 1964), hence positing that, all else equal, motivation will be stronger 
if there is a stronger link between performance and rewards (Bartol & Durham, 2000; Bonner & 
Sprinkle, 2002; Kahn & Sherer, 1990; Lawler, 1971). Thus, financial rewards that are strongly 
tied to individual performance increase employees’ effort, and this increased effort is supposed 
to lead to increases in performance (Bonner & Sprinkle, 2002; Lawler, 1971). Similarly, agency 
theory predicts that if performance can be monitored and tied to awards, then the rewards system 
can improve individual performance (Bartol & Locke, 2000; Eisenhardt, 1989). Agency theory 
also posits that a strong PFP plan can help solve the risk-sharing problem that organizations 
often experience in agency relationships by leading people who are highly risk-averse and less 
productive to leave their jobs (Cadsby et al., 2007; Eisenhardt, 1989). Tournament theory 
suggests that employees compete for higher rewards, and so a stronger link between performance 
and rewards should be associated with greater effort to achieve the higher awards (Becker & 
Huselid, 1992). At the same time, the competition among individuals attracts high performers but 
increases voluntary turnover of poor performers (Bloom & Michel, 2002; Shaw & Gupta, 2007). 
Even though some have argued that equity theory is counter to PFP, it has been recognized that 
equity does not mean equality (Brown, Sturman, & Simmering, 2003; Trevor, Reilly, & Gerhart, 
2012). To maintain equity across employees, it is necessary to link pay and performance so that 
individuals’ ratios of performance to rewards are maintained across performance levels.  
To understand the potentially different effects of PFP plans, we must therefore 
specifically examine the strengths of the associations between performance and rewards. 
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Research has provided examples of widely disparate relationships between pay and performance 
under nominal PFP plans. For example, research has shown varying relationships between raises 
and performance under merit plans (e.g., Harris, Gilbreath, & Sunday, 1998; Kahn & Sherer, 
1990; Markham, 1988). Similarly, some research has examined bonus plans that have only a 
modest correlation between performance evaluations and bonuses (e.g., r=.15 in Mizruchi, 
Stearns, & Fleischer, 2011), where others have shown stronger relationships (e.g., r=.42 in 
Salamin & Hom, 2005). Research on LTI has been more limited. One exception (Cappelli & 
Conyon, 2011) examined how stock incentives relate to employees’ future job performance. In 
the study, all employees at the same administrative level received the same amount of shares 
with the same vesting requirements. The results showed that higher profits led individual 
employees to better performance. This research shows that LTI can influence individual 
employee performance, but more research is noted to understand how strong this effect is, 
particularly in relation to other PFP options. 
 In this study, we consider complex environments where more than a single PFP form is 
provided. First, we look at incentive effects of multiple PFP plans that have been implemented 
simultaneously.     
Incentive Effects of Pay-for-Performance 
Incentive Effects of PFP Plans, Considered Simultaneously. The fundamental premise 
behind PFP plans is that by tying pay to higher performance levels, such plans will motivate 
higher performance. All else equal, and based most directly on expectancy and tournament 
theory, stronger connections should be associated with greater performance gains. The context of 
a multiple PFP environment, though, presents an untested theoretical question. In field settings, it 
is often unclear if a specific PFP plan under consideration was the sole PFP plan or if other PFP 
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plans might have been in place. The theory, though, is quite general in its propositions, 
suggesting that if a given PFP plan creates a link between performance and pay, it should be 
associated with improved individual performance. While prior findings predicted that each form 
of PFP should be related to higher performance levels, this has been framed when considering a 
comparison to a null effect (e.g., Banker et al., 1996; 2001; Lazear, 2000; Pearce et al., 1985) or 
relative to the other plans (Kahn & Sherer, 1990; Nyberg, Pieper, & Trevor, in press)   
When we consider the plans simultaneously, the situation is more complex. We cannot 
simply assume that the incentive effects from all three plans combine linearly, because their 
effects are not independent. Particularly, if we are considering how pay is tied to performance, 
the way in which pay and performance are linked may essentially overlap across plans. When 
considering multiple pay plans, one must therefore consider the independent effects of each pay 
plan. That is, we must ask: what is the effect of a given PFP plan after controlling for the effects 
of the other PFP plans that are present? For example, to know the effect of merit pay in a multi-
PFP environment, we must look at the relationship between merit pay and performance after 
controlling for the relationships between pay and performance from the other PFP plans. This 
represents the incentive effects uniquely attributable to the particular PFP plan. Stated in more 
statistical terms, this means we are looking at the partialled effects of each pay form: the 
relationship between pay and performance for a given pay form after controlling for the effects 
of the relationship between pay and performance for all other pay forms. When considering 
multiple PFP plans simultaneously, we only expect a given PFP plan to have an effect if the plan 
still has a relationship with performance after controlling for the relationships from the other pay 
forms. Hence, we predict: 
Hypothesis 1: When considering the incentive effects of multiple pay plans 
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simultaneously, the strength of the connection between individual performance and 
associated rewards, after separating the PFP effects (i.e., controlling for effects) 
associated with other pay plans, will be positively related to future employee 
performance. 
Relative Effects of PFP Plans, Considered Simultaneously. Prior research has paid little 
attention to the valence (i.e., the attractiveness of rewards) of the monetary awards across PFP 
plans (cf., Gerhart, Minkoff & Olsen, 1995). Yet, with the multiple pay forms that are the focus 
of this study—merit pay, bonuses, and LTI—one cannot assume that valences are equal. 
Individuals should value rewards differently due to their particular characteristics. With unequal 
valences, the incentive effects of different pay plans should likewise be unequal.  
The theories reviewed earlier have essentially the same key take-away: that more is 
better. As has been most typically applied, that “more” has been considered within the context of 
a single pay form; yet, the same basic concept would seem to apply if there are multiple pay 
forms. Expectancy theory would predict that if one is covered by multiple pay plans, and 
assuming the plans operated independently (i.e., each relationship between pay and performance 
effect was independent of the other PFP relationships) and the valences for those pay plans were 
equal (i.e., the rewards from each plan were valued equally), the motivational effects from 
multiple pay plans should be cumulative. For considering multiple pay plans, however, such 
simplifications are unlikely. This is due to two fundamental issues that must be considered to 
form hypotheses regarding multiple pay forms: the different levels of valence across plans, and 
the non-independence of PFP relationships across plans. 
While there certainly may be individual differences with regard to pay preferences and 
valence (Mitchell & Mickel, 1999), all else being equal, a larger reward should be perceived 
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more positively than a smaller reward. Similarly, individuals’ preferences for rewards are a 
function of delay (i.e., immediate versus delayed rewards) and risk. According to decision-
making literature, future uncertain rewards are less valued than immediate assured rewards 
(Green & Myerson, 2004; Steel & Konig, 2006). Immediate rewards should be perceived more 
positively than a future reward of the same amount. Likewise, a guaranteed reward should be 
perceived more positively than a risky reward. Steel and Konig (2006) addressed that individuals 
are more likely to value immediate but smaller rewards than large but distant ones when they 
need to choose some behaviors that lead to rewards. Indeed, people tend to undervalue future 
events. Thus, the three pay plan types we are examining—merit pay, bonuses, and LTI—clearly 
differ with regard to their value, immediacy, and risk. The objective characteristics of the 
rewards can, depending on individual differences, be interpreted as the attractiveness of the 
rewards (valence). 
A key characteristic of merit pay is that it permanently increases employees’ base pay. 
Although new merit raises have to be re-earned each year, once a raise is given, the individual 
will continue to receive that reward as long as the individual remains with the organization. This 
characteristic differentiates merit pay from the other forms of PFP that we discuss. Bonuses are 
one-time payments, and thus do not change an individual’s level of base pay (Sturman & Short, 
2000). As a one-time payment, the economic value of a bonus is always less than that of a raise 
for any person staying beyond one year. Due to the characteristics of merit pay, the permanent 
increase from merit pay has a greater lifetime value than the one-time rewards granted by other 
pay plans (Shaw, Duffy, Mitra, Lockhart, & Bowler, 2003). Whether from an expectancy theory 
perspective based on the idea that a permanent increase has greater valence than a one-time 
payment, or from a tournament theory perspective stemming from a raise constituting a larger 
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pay differential than a bonus, on a unit-per-unit basis (e.g., a $1 raise versus a $1 bonus), the 
incentive effect for merit pay should be greater than the incentive effect for bonuses.  
LTI represent one-time payments; however, while bonuses are immediate payments, LTI are not. 
LTI require a vesting period (cf., Dunford, Oler, & Boudreau, 2008) and so are not immediately 
liquid. Stock awards are also more risky, as the value of the award can fluctuate with time and 
even become zero (Hull, 2012). As noted earlier, all else equal, individuals typically prefer 
immediate rewards to delayed rewards (e.g., Green & Myerson, 2004). In addition, the liquidity 
of cash bonuses causes such rewards, on a dollar-per-dollar basis, to have a greater present value 
than a comparably sized stock award. Together, these characteristics indicate a lower valence for 
LTI than both raises and bonuses. Note, though, that we are not examining group-level 
outcomes. It may indeed be true that LTI more effectively influences group-level outcomes than 
more individually-oriented PFP plans. This question, though, is beyond the scope of our paper, 
although it is certainly an interesting potential area for future research. Thus, we predict:  
Hypothesis 2: If the separated PFP relationship (i.e., the effects for each plan, after 
controlling for the PFP effects of the other plans) for each plan has effects (is greater 
than zero), the incentive effect for merit pay on individual job performance should be 
greater than the incentive effect for bonuses, which should be greater than the incentive 
effect for LTI. 
However, if the PFP relationship for any pay form is zero after controlling for the effects 
of the other pay plans, then regardless of the pay form, the effect of that PFP relationship should 
be unrelated to performance. Thus, we predict 
Hypothesis 3: For any plan type where the separated PFP relationship (i.e., the effect of 
the plan, after controlling for the PFP effects of the other plans) has no effects (is not 
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significantly different from zero), the incentive effect of the connection between pay and 
performance for that plan on individual job performance should be zero.  
Sorting Effects of Pay-for-Performance 
Sorting Effects of PFP Plans, Considered Simultaneously. In addition to incentive 
effects, PFP plans can play an important role in attracting and retaining highly productive 
employees (Bartol & Durham, 2000; Gerhart & Fang, 2014). Research has shown that the 
relationship between performance and turnover is curvilinear, such that high performers and low 
performers are most likely to leave an organization (Salamin & Hom, 2005; Sturman, Shao, & 
Katz, 2012; Trevor et al., 1997). A higher PFP relationship, however, should decrease high-
performer turnover because the high reward contingency leads to lower desirability of movement 
(e.g., Allen & Griffeth, 2001; Jackofsky, Ferris, & Breckenridge, 1986; Trevor et al., 1997). 
Empirical research specifically into how different forms of PFP influence sorting effects, 
though, is limited (Gerhart et al., 2009). Trevor et al. (1997) looked at mean salary growth over a 
four-year period. They found that higher salary growth reduced the overall likelihood of turnover 
and the turnover of high performers. Similarly, Salamin and Hom (2005) looked at individuals’ 
mean pay increase and latest bonus as moderators of the performance-turnover relationship. 
They found that bonuses reduced the probability of turnover. In contrast to Trevor et al. (1997), 
though, Salamin and Hom (2005) found that raises had no significant effect on how performance 
related to turnover.  
Both Trevor et al. (1997) and Salamin and Hom (2005) considered how pay influences 
the effect of performance on turnover; they did not, however, specifically consider how strongly 
pay and performance were linked. In Trevor et al. (2007), the correlation between performance 
and average salary growth was 0.30. In Salamin and Hom (2005), the correlation between the 
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mean pay increase and performance was only 0.05, whereas the correlation between performance 
and the latest bonus was 0.42. Thus, the discrepant results associated with pay increases between 
these two studies may be due to the different strengths of the connection between pay and 
performance (Zenger, 1992). In both studies, when there was a higher correlation between pay 
and performance (i.e., 0.30 or 0.42), the pay system did improve retention of high performers. 
Research on LTI is more limited. Some research on executive compensation has shown 
that stock awards and other LTI are associated with reduced turnover (e.g., Batt & Colvin, 2011; 
Mehran & Yermack, 1996). Other research has examined the how repricing underwater stock 
options influences turnover (e.g., Carter & Lynch 2004; Daily, Certo, & Dalton, 2002; Dunford 
et al. 2005). No research has yet addressed if LTI affects the performance-turnover relationship. 
Research also has yet to specifically examine the degree to which a PFP link for multiple 
types of pay forms influences individual turnover. Relevant theory, however, can provide some 
insights into the nature of the sorting effects that we might expect. Tying pay to performance 
should reduce the desirability of turnover for high performers (Allen & Griffeth, 2001; Salamin 
& Hom, 2005; Schwab, 1991; Trevor, et al., 1997; Williams, 1999). The degree of this 
contingency should moderate the relationship between performance and desirability of 
movement. This prediction held in instances when raises (Trevor et al., 1997) and bonuses 
(Salamin & Hom, 2005) were related to performance, but not when raises were unrelated to 
performance (Salamin & Hom, 2005). Thus, we expect that PFP, no matter what the form, 
should help reduce the probability of high-performer turnover, but also that the nature of the 
reward (raise, bonus, or LTI) makes relative differences in PFP effectiveness. It is again more 
complex to consider multiple plans operating simultaneously. 
The way PFP influences turnover is based on the supposition that it moderates the 
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relationship between performance and the desirability of turnover (Allen & Griffeth, 2001). This 
is based more on theories of equity and fairness than expectancy. As such, partialling out the 
relationship between pay and performance should not necessarily have the same effect on 
turnover as it does on performance. We still expect that each PFP plan will have an effect on 
reducing employee voluntary turnover when considered simultaneously because, to the extent 
that each plan links pay and performance, each plan is reinforcing the equity relationship that 
high outputs (performance) are tied to high inputs (rewards). 
The enduring nature of merit pay indicates a potentially strong sorting effect. Because a 
raise has a permanent effect on base pay, once it is earned in a given year, it will be repeatedly 
earned, even if performance declines. Furthermore, current raises can lead to more future value 
because raises are compounded. That is, as raises are typically expressed as a percent of salary 
(Milkovich et al., 2013), a raise creates more value for future raises. It may also make future 
bonuses and LTI larger if they are based on the size of the individual’s salary. Thus, in 
comparison to a one-time bonus or LTI, a raise should have the greatest potential for retaining 
employees in contrast to a comparably-sized bonus or LTI. We therefore predict 
Hypothesis 4: When considering merit pay, bonuses, and LTI plans simultaneously, the 
PFP for merit pay will negatively moderate the performance-turnover relationship. 
 While we again predict the strongest effect for merit pay, the sorting effects of bonuses 
versus LTI should differ from their incentive effects. A key purpose of deferring compensation is 
to foster employee retention (e.g., Core & Guay, 2001; Jones & Kato, 1995; Oyer & Schaefer, 
2005). Providing LTI increases the cost of turnover for employees because leaving the 
organization requires them to forfeit any rewards that are not vested. Thus, we predict 
Hypothesis 5: When considering merit pay, bonuses, and LTI plans simultaneously, the 
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PFP for LTI will negatively moderate the performance-turnover relationship. 
Relative Effects of PFP Plans, Considered Simultaneously. Both merit pay and LTI, by 
increasing the cost of turnover, should reduce the likelihood of high-performance turnover. Yet 
because a merit pay award has greater value than an equally sized LTI award, we again expect 
merit pay to have a stronger effect. We therefore predict 
Hypothesis 6: When considering merit pay, bonuses, and LTI plans simultaneously, the 
effect of PFP on the performance-turnover relationship will be stronger (i.e., more 
negative) for merit pay than for LTI. 
The nature of bonuses, though, makes their effects less clear. This is because bonuses 
have characteristics which both decrease the desirability of movement but increase the ease of 
movement. By having a connection between pay and performance, bonuses will increase equity 
and fairness perceptions of high performers, thus decreasing the desirability of movement. At the 
same time, the large monetary influx from a large bonus may actually increase the individual’s 
ease of movement. This can occur because either (1) the monetary reserves make leaving one job 
and finding another more feasible, or (2) if the individual had an intent to leave, was a high 
performer, and was expecting a large bonus, it would be most logical to wait for the bonus before 
leaving the position. Consistent with this, Sturman and Short (2000) showed that bonus 
satisfaction was negatively related to intent to turnover when not considering other aspects of 
pay satisfaction or other attitudes; however, after controlling for the other pay satisfaction 
dimensions (including for raises), bonuses actually had a positive effect on intent-to-turnover. 
Thus, because bonuses seemingly can create both incentives and disincentives for turnover when 
considered simultaneously with other PFP plans, we have no a priori hypotheses regarding their 
effects when considered in conjunction with merit raises and LTI. 
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METHOD 
Sample 
The data for this study were obtained from a large service-related company that was a 
subsidiary of a larger, diversified publicly traded American corporation. The company which is 
the focus of our study offers broad-based business services to companies in the global travel 
industry, providing technology and support to global travel companies and managing technology 
related to online travel. The business thus focuses on issues of technology and pricing, but has 
positions in account sales and service, accounting, customer training and support, finance, human 
resources, legal, marketing and communications, and product and technology development. The 
company provided data on performance ratings, gender, organization tenure, salary, and 
percentage of three financial rewards (merit pay, bonuses, and LTI) associated with 2001 and 
2002. We only examined employees who had performance ratings in 2001, did not leave 
involuntarily in 2002, and were eligible for all three forms of compensation. This resulted in an 
original potential sample of 900 employees from 17 locations in the U.S. All positions were 
white-collar, exempt, full-time, and required a college degree. The most common job titles were 
Developer, Senior Developer, Systems Engineer, Travel Supervisor, Account Manager, and 
Project Manager. 
It should also be noted that the references to the calendar year are not entirely precise in 
that they refer to the relevant time period and not the date of the award or decision. Performance 
reviews in a given year are intended to reflect the individual’s performance for that calendar year 
(so, the 2001 performance rating is designed to capture performance during the 2001 year, but 
was determined in early 2002). Compensation awards associated with a given year reflect the 
award of each type given for that year. Thus, the 2001 bonus is actually awarded in 2002, but is 
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awarded to the individual for service over the 2001 year. Similarly, the 2001 raise is awarded in 
early 2002, as is the 2001 LTI. We refer to 2001 rewards to represent the awards associated with 
2001 performance. Note that 2001 salary, though, was the salary at the beginning of 2001. 
To provide an estimate of the PFP relationships for each employee (as will be explained 
in greater detail below), we calculated the relationship that existed between 2001 performance 
and each resultant form of compensation for 2001 performance under each supervisor. Thus, we 
eliminated all individuals in the sample who did not have the same supervisor in both 2001 and 
2002 and (for the purposes of being able to compute PFP relationships for each supervisor, as we 
will explain below) all employees under supervisors who did not have at least 3 subordinates. 
This resulted in a sample of 720 employees under 88 supervisors. Supervisors had an average of 
8.1 subordinates (SD = 7.58; range = 3 - 59). For predicting 2002 performance, we eliminated 
subjects who left the organization (and thus did not have 2002 performance ratings), resulting in 
a sample of 635 employees (also under 88 supervisors). 
Organizational Compensation System 
The organization provided guidance to supervisors regarding the allocation of 
compensation, but supervisors had discretion in the allocation decisions. This is a typical 
approach used by many organizations for their PFP plans (cf., WorldatWork, 2012). For merit 
pay, a range of percent pay increases were specified for each performance rating category. 
Supervisors had discretion regarding what the specific raise should be within this range.  
The company paid bonuses, which reflected the judgment of the supervisor based on the 
individual’s performance rating and the individual’s position. Each position had a bonus target, 
based on its degree of responsibility. Organizational performance affected the amount of total 
rewards that would be distributed, a decision made by executives within the organization (not in 
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our sample). Supervisors were given a budget with which to allocate rewards to their 
subordinates. They were instructed to use the bonus target and individual performance to guide 
their decisions, but had discretion with regard to how actual distributions were made. Managers 
did not have complete discretion, though, in that all pay decisions were ultimately approved by 
the human resources department. 
The distribution of LTI was based on both organizational performance (which determined 
the budget for this award) and individual job performance, although the dollar value of actual 
awards was also affected by the performance of the company’s stock. Each year, the company 
distributed restricted stock units to their employees based on individual performance and 
criticality of employees’ job positions. At the time of the award, the restricted stock had no real 
market value. Rather, these stock grants would, at a future vesting date, “turn into” actual shares 
of the company’s real stock. In other words, when granted, the restricted stock had no 
immediately realizable monetary value (although it was expressed as such, based on the number 
of shares and its current price). The company used a five-year gradual vesting schedule, with 
20% of the stocks becoming vested each year (and the value of that award constituting income). 
Once vested, the award had the same market value as any other share of common stock from the 
organization. Over the span of this study, the value of company stock did vary, but increased an 
average of 1.08% per month. Employees of the company were educated about the financial 
rewards system via intranet, written communication, and training workshops. 
Measures 
Employee job performance. Employee job performance ratings from 2001 and 2002 
were used as independent and dependent variables. The ratings used a 4-point scale: significantly 
exceeds expectations, exceeds expectations, meets expectations, and below expectations. The 
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ratings were transformed to indicator variables from 1 (lowest performance) to 4 (highest 
performance). The company used “management by objectives” to create performance ratings, 
and significant time is allocated by the organization for these purposes.  
For predicting turnover, we needed to examine potential non-linear effects of 
performance (Salamin & Hom, 2005; Sturman et al., 2012; Trevor et al., 1997). For these 
analyses, we considered both a linear effect, computed as a mean-centered measure of 2001 
performance, and a quadratic effect. Because we wanted to specifically differentiate between 
linear and non-linear effects, we needed to ensure that the two terms were orthogonal. Although 
mean-centering (cf., Aiken & West, 1991) is common and can reduce the correlation between 
linear and squared terms, it does not yield orthogonal terms. Indeed, in this case, mean centering 
would still result in the linear and quadratic terms being correlated 0.21. We therefore used 
residual-centering (Lance, 1988). That is, we regressed the squared term on the linear term and 
used the residual to represent the quadratic effect. This residual is uncorrelated with the linear 
term but captures the non-linearity associated with the squared term (Lance, 1988). Residual-
centering has been shown to be effective in cases like this one, in which (1) the main and 
quadratic effects are correlated, (2) sample sizes are moderate to large, and (3) decomposition of 
the effects is desired (Lance, 1988). 
Measuring the Pay-for-Performance Relationships. To test our hypotheses, we needed a 
measure of the link between pay and performance for the three compensation plans. Prior 
compensation research has examined this by looking at the reward received (e.g., the change in 
pay or total compensation) divided by the performance score (e.g., a given dollar change in 
share-holder value or firm return) (e.g., Hall & Knox, 2004; Hayes, 2004) or by calculating the 
derivative of pay with respect to performance (e.g., Kahn & Sherer, 1990). The former approach 
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is not ideal for our study, as it is simply an individual’s ratio and does not directly capture a 
relationship between pay and performance. It is unclear if effects from such ratios are due to the 
numerator, denominator, or the hypothesized combination of the two. It also does not capture if 
indeed there is a pattern of pay and performance effects across individuals (which is what PFP 
plans are purported to have). The approach of calculating a derivative (e.g., Kahn & Sherer, 
1990) more directly assesses if there is a relationship between performance and pay, but the 
approach is based on looking at effects associated with interactions with performance scores 
(because if there is a straightforward relationship between pay and performance, this becomes a 
constant that is equal across subjects). We wanted to more directly assess exactly how pay and 
performance are related to each other within groups that should share a similar effect. To 
estimate this relationship for each employee, we therefore examined the strength of the link 
between pay and performance under each supervisor.  
For each supervisor (as noted above, with at least 3 subordinates), we computed the three 
regression coefficients that estimated the relationships between 2001 performance and the three 
forms of 2001 rewards. For each supervisor and pay form, the percent reward was regressed on 
the employee performance rating. Rewards were presented as percentage points (so 1 = 1%), and 
the raw rating metric (1-4) was used as the independent variable. For each pay form, we thus ran 
88 regressions. This yielded 88 B coefficients associated with each of the three PFP 
relationships, which we labeled PFP-Merit, PFP-Bonus, and PFP-LTI. 
It should be noted that, for subsequent analyses, our PFP metrics were not independent. 
That is, individual observations of PFP were not fully independent because employees under the 
same supervisor operated under the same PFP relationship. We thus needed to use multi-level 
modeling (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002) when considering the PFP effects of the various plans. 
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This approach to measuring PFP, while new, has a number of advantages. Most notably, 
it directly assesses the simple and straightforward relationship that exists between pay and 
performance for each pay form, which matches the measure to the theoretical premise better than 
other PFP measures have done. Note also that this approach does not require us to assume that 
individuals know what others get paid. If a supervisor has a strong PFP relationship, a low 
performer will see a low reward and a high performer will see a higher reward (which is similar 
to what a ratio score would yield). If the supervisor has no relationship between pay and 
performance, this measure will yield a zero as opposed to a ratio score what would yield a high 
value for a low performer and low value for a high performer. Although individuals may or may 
not know what others receive, people are likely aware of what typical awards are, either in the 
company overall or in the economy. A measure of slope (which is what our measure is) thus does 
not suffer from as much random variance that can occur with ratio scores, even without 
necessarily assuming that individuals know the performance and rewards of their peers. It should 
also be noted that this metric has very practical benefits. As an objective measure of PFP, it 
captures the actual relationship that exists between pay and performance, which is something that 
can be influenced by organizational policy. It is also a measure that companies can calculate 
using archival data, and thus allows organizations to critically evaluate their current PFP plans. 
Voluntary turnover. Voluntary turnover included departures from the company during 
2002. One concern in turnover research is that some previous research has failed to distinguish 
between voluntary turnover and involuntary turnover (Gardner, Wright, & Moynihan, 2011; 
Gerhart, 1990; Wright & Cropanzano, 1998). Fortunately, the company provided specific 
information which distinguished between voluntary and involuntary turnover. Thus, we only 
considered voluntary turnover. In the sample, 85 (12%) of the 720 employees voluntarily left the 
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company. We used a “0” to indicate that an employee stayed with the company and a “1” to 
indicate voluntary turnover (although it was treated in most analyses as a categorical variable).  
  Control variables. Because this study examined the effect of financial rewards on 
employees’ future performance, previous performance (i.e., 2001 job performance rating) was 
used as a control variable. Using prior performance as a control variable helps partial out the 
effects of stable characteristics that caused employees’ performance (Sturman, 2003; Sturman, 
Cheramie, & Cashen, 2005) and unmeasured effects that are attributable to omitted factors (e.g., 
ability, job knowledge, motivation levels, or opportunities to perform) that might affect 
performance and pay (Kahn & Sherer, 1990; Sturman, 2007). While performance ratings 
certainly are not perfect measures (Viswesvaran, Ones, & Schmidt, 1996), its inclusion does help 
address the alternative explanation that high performers get rewarded but also remain high 
performers. We want to know what affect PFP has beyond knowing that, in general, past 
performance is the best predictor of future performance (Sturman et al., 2005). 
Organization tenure was used as a control variable because it could interfere with testing 
the main effects of the different characteristics of financial rewards on future performance 
(Sturman, 2003). Gender differences have been considered a potentially important factor causing 
pay differences (Milkovich et al., 2013), and so were also controlled for (with men coded as 0, 
and women coded as 1). Additionally, salary from 2001 was controlled in this study, as was the 
level of the most recent raise, bonus, and LTI. Because the salary data was skewed, we used a 
log transformation to reduce the leverage of high values. The raise, bonus, and LTI were 
expressed as a percent of salary (before log transformation). 
Analyses 
Before we test our hypotheses, we wanted to replicate prior findings and thus see if our 
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sample provides similar results to prior research. Our analyses are thus conducted in a series of 
steps. First, we create a baseline model without PFP variables, to serve as a point of reference 
(Model 1). We then run a series of models in which we consider a single pay plan at a time. This 
allows us to replicate prior research which has examined a single pay plan at a time but did not 
consider if other PFP plans were in effect. Thus, we run a model examining merit pay (Model 
2a), bonuses (Model 2b), and LTI (Model 2c). Then, we test our hypotheses with the model 
which includes all three plans simultaneously (Model 3). 
Incentive Effects. In all of our models, because individuals were nested within 
supervisors, we used hierarchical linear modeling (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002) using the HLM7 
statistical package (Raudenbush, Bryk, Cheong, Congdon, & du Toit, 2011). To test the 
incentive effects of independent PFP plans and relative effects of different PFP plans, our 
dependent variable was 2002 job performance. The level-1 model we used was: 
 Perf2002 = B00 + B1*Perf2001 + B2*Gender + B3*Tenure  
 + B4*ln(Salary2001) + B5*Merit% + B6*Bonus% + B7*LTI% + ε [1] 
In this model, the intercept (B00) was modeled as a random effect.  
The second level of analyses varied depending on what type of PFP plans we tested. As 
noted above, we first examine each PFP plan separately. Thus, the PFP effect for each pay form 
was entered as the sole level-2 variable. So, to test the effect of merit pay (Model 2a), the level-2 
equation was  
 B00 = G00 + G01*PFP-Merit + ξ [2a] 
whereas to test the effect of bonus pay (Model 2b), the level-2 equation was 
 B00 = G00 + G01* PFP-Bonus + ξ [2b] 
and to test the effect of LTI (Model 2c), the level-2 equation was 
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 B00 = G00 + G01* PFP-LTI + ξ [2c] 
To test our hypotheses related to incentive effects of all three plans simultaneously (Model 3), 
the level-2 equation was 
 B00 = G00 + G01*PFP-Merit + G02*PFP-Bonus + G03*PFP-LTI + ξ [3] 
Sorting Effects. For assessing sorting effects, because turnover is a dichotomous 
variable, we used the Bernoulli model in HLM. Thus, our analyses are multi-level but analogous 
to logistic regression (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). For our test of independent sorting effects, 
our level-1 model was as follows:  
 Prob(turnover) = B00 + B10*Perf2001 + B20*Perf
2
2001 + B3*Gender + B4*Tenure  
 + B5*ln(Salary2001) + B6*Merit% + B7*Bonus% + B8*LTI% + ε [4] 
For this model, the intercept and the effects of performance could potentially vary across 
supervisors, as these coefficients could be affected by the degree of PFP resulting from each 
supervisor’s decisions. Testing revealed, though, that there was only significant level-2 variance 
for the intercept term; for B10 and B20, the variance component was not significant (at p > .50). 
Thus, only the intercept was modeled as a random effect. Nonetheless, for all three of these 
coefficients, the level-2 equations were equivalent to Equation 2a 2b, and 2c above, with the key 
differences being (1) that there are three equations, with the dependent variables being B00, B10, 
and B20, and (2) that there was no level-2 error term in the equations predicting B10 and B20. 
Thus, to test the hypotheses related to sorting effects, the level 2 equations were as follows: 
 B00 = G00 + G01*PFP-Merit + G02*PFP-Bonus + G03*PFP-LTI + ξ [5a] 
 B10 = G00 + G01*PFP-Merit + G02*PFP-Bonus + G03*PFP-LTI [5b] 
 B20 = G00 + G01*PFP-Merit + G02*PFP-Bonus + G03*PFP-LTI [5c] 
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RESULTS 
Summary statistics are presented in Tables 1 and 2. Table 1 presents the summary 
statistics for the portion of the sample (N=635) used in the analyses predicting job performance; 
Table 2 presents the summary statistics for the sample used in the prediction of turnover (N = 
720). Note that the means of merit%, bonus%, and LTI% (shown in Table 2) were 3.08%, 
7.02%, and 1.19% respectively. Thus, the average additional compensation received by 
employees was 11.29%, although only 3.08% was an increase in base pay.  
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 and 2 about here 
--------------------------------------- 
For merit pay, across the four performance ratings, the average pay increases were 1.9% 
(below expectations), 2.8% (average performance), 3.3% (exceeding expectations), and 4.6% 
(far exceeding expectations). These levels are similar to the average merit increases in these or 
similar performance categories reported by Gerhart and Fang (2014). The mean PFP relationship 
for merit pay was 0.62 (SD = 0.14) and ranged from 0 to 0.95; for bonuses, the mean was 0.73 
(SD = 1.9) and ranged from -1.1 to 10.5; and for LTI, the mean was 0.57 (SD = 1.48) and ranged 
from 0.02 to 9.2. This means, for example, a one-point increase in performance was associated 
with, on average, a 0.62 percentage point higher raise. The average raise for a high performer (4) 
is thus 1.86 percentage points higher than that for low performer (1). For some supervisors, 
larger bonuses were actually granted to lower performers, as evidenced by a minimum PFP-
Bonus value of -1.1. However, as noted, the average relationship was 0.73. 
There are also some strong correlations among the PFP variables and the pay amount 
percent variables. For example, the relationship between PFP-Bonus and PFP-LTI was strong (r 
= .73), showing that managers are fairly consistent in how they distribute bonuses and LTI. Of 
course, although a high correlation, it still indicates that nearly half the variance between these 
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variables is unexplained, and thus there clearly are differences in how managers allocate awards.  
Variance components for all models are presented in Table 3 and 4. For both the 
prediction of 2002 job performance and voluntary turnover, the analyses revealed significant 
level-2 variance (p’s < .05) for the intercepts in the random-intercepts models.  
Replicating Previous Findings 
Independent Incentive Effects. Models 2a, 2b, and 2c in Table 3 present the results of 
the HLM analyses which examine a single pay plan at a time. These results are consistent with 
existing theory and prior empirical work. Note that these are not nested models, not fully 
comparable, and thus not used for our hypothesis tests. The purpose of these models is to 
illustrate what the results would look like if a researcher were examining a single PFP plan at a 
time in a multi-PFP environment. The results show that the strength of a PFP plan’s connection 
between individual performance and rewards is positively related to future employee 
performance when considering a single PFP plan at a time. As shown in Models 2a, 2b, and 2c 
(for merit pay, bonuses, and LTI respectively), all three PFP relationships were significantly 
related to future performance (all at p < .001).  
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
-------------------------------- 
Independent Sorting Effects. Table 4 presents the analyses predicting 2002 voluntary 
turnover, and specifically how the strength of the various PFP links influence the performance-
turnover relationship. Again, these results show that our sample produces results consistent with 
prior research.  
A model with no level-2 variables (Model 1 in Table 4) showed that performance had the 
expected negative linear effect (G10 = -0.54; p < .05) and positive non-linear effect (G20 = 0.71; p 
< .001), thus replicating the predicted inverted U-shape relationship between performance and 
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turnover (Salamin and Hom, 2005; Sturman et al., 2012; Trevor et al., 1997; specifically, the 
probability of turnover was, on average 52%, 14%, 7%, and 16% for performance scores 1 to 4, 
respectively). Adding the PFP variables to the second level of analysis was likewise consistent 
with prior research.  
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
-------------------------------- 
The results also show that the strength of each plan’s PFP link negatively moderated the 
performance-turnover relationship. As with the replication of the incentive effects, this pertained 
to considering individual PFP plans separately. As shown in Models 2a, 2b, and 2c of Table 3, if 
we were studying any single pay plan at a time that was operating in a multi-PFP environment, 
the effects of the PFP relationships all had negative effects on the linear and/or quadratic 
performance variables (all at p < .05), thus indicating that a stronger PFP relationship was 
associated with a lower probability of turnover as performance increased. So, as with incentive 
effects, were this a study about a single PFP plan, we would have yielded conclusions similar to 
prior research about PFP plans. 
Tests of Relative Incentive Effects (Hypotheses 1-3) 
Tests of our hypotheses regarding relative incentive effects are shown in Table 3, 
supporting our hypotheses. The three hypotheses pertained to considering all three plans 
simultaneously. Testing these hypotheses involved considered the separating effect of each 
plan’s PFP relationship. This is important because the PFP relationships for the three pay 
practices are correlated, with a particularly high correlation between PFP for bonuses and PFP 
for LTI.  
We first computed the partial correlation for each of the three PFP variables on 2001 
performance (i.e., the correlation between each PFP variable and 2001 performance with the 
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effects of the other two PFP variables separated out). We found that, while the raw correlation of 
each PFP relationship was significantly related to performance, the partial correlation coefficient 
for merit pay was largest (rMy.B,L = .16), followed by a smaller but still significant effect for 
bonuses (rBy.M,L = .09), and no significant relationship for LTI (rLy.M,B = -.04).  
Hypothesis 1 predicted that when considering the incentive effects of multiple pay plans 
simultaneously, the strength of the connection between individual performance and associated 
rewards, after separating out the PFP relationship associated with other PFP plans, would be 
positively related to future employee performance. Therefore, we expected a positive effect in 
our full model from merit pay and bonuses, but no effect for LTI. Model 3 in Table 3 indeed 
supports this. The effect for PFP-Merit was significant (B= 88.22, p < .01), as is the effect for 
PFP-Bonus (B= 8.09, p < .05); the effect of LTI was non-significant (B= -2.06, p=.73). 
Hypothesis 2 predicted that for each plan with significant separated PFP relationships, the 
effect for merit pay would be greater than the effect for bonuses, which again was supported (p < 
.01). Because PFP-LTI had no separated effect, Hypothesis 2 did not pertain to it. Hypothesis 3 
predicted that, for any plan type where the separated PFP relationship was zero, which is true 
here for LTI, the effect of the connection between pay and performance for that plan should be 
zero. Indeed, as noted above, the effect of PFP-LTI is non-significant (p = .73). 
Tests of Relative Sorting Effects (Hypotheses 4-6) 
The second half of our hypotheses considered the relative sorting effects of PFP plans, 
and specifically how the strength of the various PFP links would influence the performance-
turnover relationship. Model 3 in Table 4 shows the analyses predicting 2002 voluntary turnover 
and our tests of Hypotheses 4-6. 
The three hypotheses considered the effects of all three PFP plans when analyzed 
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together. Hypothesis 4 predicted that, when considering merit pay, bonuses, and LTI plans 
simultaneously, the PFP on employee turnover for merit pay would negatively moderate the 
performance-turnover relationship. This was supported by a negative effect of PFP-Merit on the 
linear effect of performance (p < .001) and a marginally non-significant effect on the quadratic 
terms (p = .095). Hypothesis 5 predicted that, when considering merit pay, bonuses, and LTI 
plans simultaneously, the PFP on employee turnover for LTI pay would negatively moderate the 
performance-turnover relationship, which was supported by both significant effects on the linear 
(p < .01) and quadratic terms (p < .001). Finally, Hypothesis 6 predicted that when considering 
merit pay, bonuses, and LTI plans simultaneously, the PFP on turnover would be stronger (i.e., 
more negative) for merit pay than for LTI. This was supported by the negative effect of PFP-
Merit being significantly more negative than the effect for LTI on the linear performance term (p 
< .05). The effect on the quadratic term was more negative as predicted, although the difference 
did not approach statistical significance (p = .35). 
As noted earlier, we had no a priori predictions regarding the effect of bonuses when 
considered simultaneously with merit pay and LTI. Our analyses revealed that, in the analysis 
with all three PFP effects, bonuses increased the overall probability of turnover through its 
significant positive effect on the intercept (p < .001; note that merit pay and LTI had significant 
negative effects). Bonuses had no effect on either the linear or quadratic performance terms. 
DISCUSSION 
Prior work on PFP has generally shown positive incentive and sorting effects, yet this 
work has not explicitly considered what effects we should expect from PFP plans when 
employees are performing in a multiple PFP plan environment. Considering how different PFP 
plans operate in the same environment requires us to consider the relative relationships we 
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should expect from PFP plans, thus requiring us to add to our theoretical precision (Edwards & 
Berry, 2010). It also requires us to consider how the relevant theory is applicable to partialled 
effects—the sorts of effects we expect for one PFP plan when controlling for the effects of other 
PFP plans. Our findings show that prior PFP research, which has generally focused on a single 
plan at a time, generalizes to more complex environments. Furthermore, the predictions of the 
relative effectiveness of PFP plans from theory generally hold, and hence the expansion of 
theory to multi-plan environments does have some external validity. 
This study provides three general forms of theoretical contributions. The first is the 
replication and confirmation of the generalizability of prior research. Our results show that prior 
PFP research—be it on a single-PFP plan or in multi-PFP plan environments but with the other 
plans not considered—replicates and generalizes to multi-PFP plan environments. The general 
findings of incentive and sorting effects do hold when considering PFP plans independently, 
even when other PFP plans are operating but are not controlled for in the analyses. 
Second, our results provide a test of the theoretical precision of theories that have been 
related to PFP plans. Because of the different sorts of rewards associated with different PFP 
plans, expectancy theory in particular would predict different effects. Expectancy theory remains 
one of the dominant decision-making theories (Vancouver, Weinhardt, & Schmidt, 2010), and 
continues to play an important role in its own right (Cadsby et al., 2007; Gerhart et al., 2009; 
Kepes, Delery, & Gupta, 2009) in addition to being incorporated into more sophisticated current 
theories of motivation (e.g., Schmidt & DeShon, 2007; Steel & Konig, 2006; Vancouver et al. 
2010). While the internal validity of expectancy theory has generally been supported (i.e. general 
positive effects found for expectancy, valence, or the interaction; see Van Eerde & Thierry, 
1996), there is far less research testing the external validity of the theory (its ability to make 
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accurate predictions in new contexts) or if its tenets hold for predicting the relative effects of 
expectancy or valence. We do indeed support the applicability of expectancy theory for making 
such predictions. In the replication, the results show that merit pay is more valuable than a bonus 
or LTI on a dollar-per-dollar basis, and indeed it has stronger incentive and sorting effects.  
Third, we expanded on prior theory to consider the implications of multiple pay plans 
being implemented simultaneously. While some prior work has analyzed situations with multiple 
pay plans (Kahn & Sherer, 1990; Salamin & Hom, 2005), both of those studies had one pay plan 
where rewards were unrelated to performance; additionally, these studies did not explicitly 
consider how multiple pay plans operating simultaneously might be different from plans’ 
independent effects. We specifically predicted and supported that considering partialled effects is 
important for incentive effects, while not so for sorting effects.  
Our study thus provides a theoretically consistent explanation for the mixed results 
previously observed for merit pay. The effectiveness of merit pay has been repeatedly questioned 
(Gerhart et al., 2009; Gerhart & Rynes, 2003; Heneman & Werner, 2005). A key concern is that 
differences in awards between the best and the worst performers are often not large (Gomez-
Mejia & Balkin, 1989); others have shown examples where there is actually no relationship 
between pay and performance in a nominal merit pay plan (e.g., Kahn & Sherer, 1990). These 
concerns, though, are not completely generalizable to all implementations of merit pay. Rather, 
when viewed through the lens of expectancy theory, they suggest that the merit plans are often 
poorly implemented because they fail to generate a PFP link. Our findings provide a better 
understanding of the mechanisms that PFP plans should have so as to yield the desired results. 
Our results show that it is an overgeneralization to suggest there is a single positive effect for any 
type of PFP plan. Instead, PFP plan effectiveness depends on how strongly pay and performance 
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are linked. Furthermore, the practical effects of any pay plan will also depend on the budget for 
the awards, for without resources, it is difficult to create a plan with a strong PFP link. Thus, 
while our results showed that merit pay has the strongest effects on performance and turnover in 
multi-PFP environments, if an organization fails to create a link between raises and performance, 
even if they call it a merit plan, we would not expect merit pay to be an effective tool. 
Our study is also one of the few studies to examine the effect of LTI on individual 
employees. When considered independently, PFP for LTI was related to increased performance; 
however, in this context, the link between pay and performance after partialling out the links 
with the other pay plans was not significant. This limited the potential incentive effect of LTI 
when considered in conjunction with the other PFP plans, although it still had a sorting effect. 
Further research on LTI would be useful, as our results show that, in general, the effectiveness of 
a compensation plan is a function of its characteristics. We only examined a single LTI plan in 
this paper; other plans may vary in terms of their vesting requirements and the specific reward 
granted, and thus can be more complex (Moynihan, 2013).  
Motivational theories have strongly supported the underlying mechanisms of PFP plans 
regarding the extent to which financial rewards can motivate employees to higher performance 
and the desirable behaviors that organizations expect. Situations have become, for both 
organizations and employees, more multifaceted due to organizations providing more complex 
compensation system environments and employees being covered by multiple PFP plans. Future 
compensation research needs to consider more carefully the effectiveness of PFPs. Indeed, each 
PFP has a different form and set of characteristics, and all of the different combinations of 
multiple PFPs that organizations provide will have relative effects on various important 
outcomes. This creates more complex decision-making and motivational processes that need 
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greater research attention. 
Overall, a key theoretical contribution from this paper is our demonstration of the 
potential and utility associated with developing greater theoretical precision (Edwards and Berry, 
2010). Simply calling a plan PFP is insufficient, and that while general directional effects are 
valid, theory can be extended to predict the relative effectiveness of PFP plans. Future theoretical 
development relevant to PFP plans requires attention to both content (i.e., the characteristics of 
the plan) and context (i.e., examining a plan in light of other PFP plans that may be in place). 
Limitations 
This paper has a number of advantages over previous PFP studies. We used longitudinal 
data controlling for prior performance to examine both the incentive and sorting effects of PFP 
plans. The study also considered the different effects of the characteristics of multiple PFP plans 
simultaneously. Like all research, though, this study is not without limitations, and it is important 
to point out the key issues which threaten the potential generalizability of our findings. 
From a theoretical perspective, this study did not directly assess individual perceptions of 
motivation; rather, the predictions were based on approximations of the relationships between 
pay and performance and from the characteristics of the plans and supervisory decisions. While 
this is not the first study to estimate PFP relationships mathematically (e.g., Kahn & Sherer, 
1990; Salamin & Hom, 2005; Trevor et al., 1997), it is not a direct test of the internal validity of 
the related theories. It would certainly be valuable to see how individuals perceive the sort of 
PFP linkages in which they are operating. While our use of theory and supported hypotheses 
provide evidence of the external validity of relevant theory, and particularly expectancy theory, 
our papers does not contribute to testing of the theories’ internal validity. 
Our single context also limits the generalizability of our findings. Other forms of PFP and 
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other simultaneous combinations of PFP plans should be examined to provide greater precision 
in our understanding of the effectiveness of compensation plans. There are many other types of 
PFP plans, and even more potential PFP portfolios. Because organizations are more likely to use 
“hybrid plans” than independent pay plans (Gerhart, 2000; Gerhart & Fang, 2014; Gomez-Mejia 
& Balkin, 1992; Gomez-Mejia, Berrone, & Franco-Santos, 2010; Milkovich et al., 2013), 
understanding how the characteristics of multiple PFP plans simultaneously affect performance 
and voluntary turnover is crucial for organizations to design effective compensation systems.  
There are also limitations to the nature of our data.  Unaddressed in this paper, there may 
exist interactions between PFP relationships. It is also possible that pay systems have effects 
beyond one year. In our analyses, we examine the effect of pay outcomes on performance or 
turnover in the subsequent year. It is possible, for example, that long-term incentives, may have 
effects that occur in subsequent years, or the strength of effects may change over time. It is 
beyond the scope of our study, in addition to the capabilities of our data, to consider the potential 
multi-year effects of hybrid pay systems, and thus our results may not be fully capturing the set 
of effects associated with these plans. 
In short, our paper represents a single case of a multi-PFP environment, and more 
research on more and different plans is needed. While performing such research will obviously 
require significant industry-academic cooperation to provide the sort of data needed to conduct 
such tests, there is great practical and theoretical value that could be provided by such work. 
Implications for Practice 
Given the prevalence of multiple PFP plan environments, our research into the effects of 
multiple PFP plans operating simultaneously has important implications for practice. First, we 
show that employees do, on average, respond rationally to incentives. Companies may want to 
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avoid raises because of the increase to fixed labor costs, but our findings show that minimizing 
merit pay means giving up a powerful PFP tool. Raises had larger effects than bonuses and LTI, 
and only raises had both incentive and sorting effects. Our findings do show that companies can 
use other pay forms to get the same effects as raises, but it would require stronger PFP links and 
larger rewards. The trade-off between higher one-time costs versus greater fixed labor costs thus 
becomes a cost-benefit decision (cf., Sturman, Trevor, Boudreau, & Gerhart, 2003).  
Second, our study shows that companies can apply PFP-related theory to the design of 
PFP plans, and thus take advantage of evidence-based management (e.g., Rousseau, 2006; 
Rousseau & McCarthy, 2007). Companies can specifically look at the degree to which managers 
link pay and rewards, and adjust policy as necessary to ensure stronger links. Most companies 
using PFP have individual performance data (WorldatWork, 2012). A related contribution of our 
study is our demonstration on how companies can use HR data to see how strongly their plans 
link pay and performance, and thus change policy based on using their HR data. 
Third, our results raise interesting questions about the use of bonuses. While bonuses 
considered independently did have positive incentive and sorting effects, after controlling for the 
effects of other PFP plans, there was actually a positive effect on turnover. This is consistent 
with the finding by Sturman and Short (2000), who found a positive effect of bonus satisfaction 
on turnover intentions after controlling for satisfaction with other pay dimensions. Organizations 
may benefit by using their available data to make similar tests in their own organizations to see if 
their pay plans, and bonuses in particular, are having unintended consequences (Pfeffer, 1998). 
Fourth and finally, this study emphasizes the importance of the relative effectiveness of 
different types of PFP plans in multi-PFP plan environment. It is very common today for 
organizations to provide their employees with more than one type of PFP. As many 
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organizations are focusing more on PFP plans, implementing a single or multiple PFP plan(s) is 
not a differentiator among organizations. With the results of our study, organizations must 
identify the complexity of pay environments and distinguish between forms and characteristics 
of different PFP plans and across PFP plan types in order to better understand how these factors 
influence employees’ motivation and decision-making processes.    
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TABLE 1 
 
Summary Statistics for Analyses of Job Performance 
 
 
Mean SD 
Level-1 Variables Level-2 Variables 
1 2 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
L
ev
el
-1
 V
ar
ia
b
le
s 
1. 2002 Performance 2.46 0.69 —           
2. 2001 Performance 2.52 0.61 .56 —          
4. Gender 0.50 0.50 -.06 -.06 —         
5. Tenure 14.26 7.26 .01 .10 .12 —        
6. Ln (2001 Salary) 11.04 0.38 .29 .22 -.29 .10 —       
7. Merit pay (%) 3.09 0.72 .77 .61 -.03 .01 .15 —      
8. Bonus Pay (%) 6.85 5.58 .22 .17 -.07 .08 .45 .19 —     
9. LTI Plan (%) 1.04 5.17 .23 .12 .00 .00 .38 .13 .61 —    
L
ev
el
-2
 
V
ar
ia
b
le
s 10. PFP-Merit 0.62 0.14 .45 .20 .05 -.03 .07 .45 .21 .19 —   
11. PFP-Bonus 0.73 1.89 .28 .17 .02 .00 .43 .18 .77 .76 .26 —  
12. PFP-LTIP 0.57 1.48 .23 .14 .04 -.01 .35 .15 .71 .81 .22 .73 — 
Notes: N = 635. Correlations greater than .08 are p < .05. 
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TABLE 2 
 
Summary Statistics for Analyses of Turnover 
 
 Mean SD 
Level-1 Variables Level-2 Variables 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
L
ev
el
-1
 V
ar
ia
b
le
s 
1. 2001 Performance 2.49 0.63 —           
2. Turnover 0.12 0.33 -.14 —          
3. Gender 0.50 0.50 -.06 .01 —         
4. Tenure 13.80 11.04 .12 -.17 .09 —        
5. Ln (2001 Salary) 11.04 0.39 .21 -.02 -.32 .12 —       
6. Merit pay (%) 3.08 0.74 .59 -.04 -.02 .00 .12 —      
7. Bonus Pay (%) 7.02 6.46 .13 -.07 -.10 .06 .47 .14 —     
8. LTI Plan (%) 1.19 6.41 .08 -.06 -.04 -.01 .40 .10 .64 —    
L
ev
el
-2
 
V
ar
ia
b
le
s 9. PFP-Merit 0.62 0.14 .13 -.03 -.07 -.03 .04 .43 .18 .17 —   
10. PFP-Bonus 0.73 1.89 .15 .01 .01 .00 .41 .17 .75 .73 .24 —  
11. PFP-LTIP 0.57 1.48 .12 -.02 .03 -.01 .13 .14 .68 .78 .21 .72 — 
Notes: N = 720. Correlations greater than .08 are p < .05.  
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TABLE 3 
Separate and Partialled Effects of PFP Plans 
Variable Model 1 Model 2a Model 2b Model 2c Model 3 
For Intercept (Random Effect) 
 Intercept -3.06 -2.38 -2.48 -2.84 -2.93 
  (0.68)*** (0.62)*** (0.71)*** (0.65)*** (0.62)*** 
 
 PFP-Merit  100.98   88.22 
   (28.16)***   (28.94)** 
 
 PFP-Bonus   8.09  8.09 
    (1.86)***  (4.81)* 
 
 PFP-LTI    8.63 -2.06 
     (2.31)*** (5.84) 
2001 Performance 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.15 
  (0.048)** (0.048)** (0.047)** (0.048)*** (0.048)** 
 
Gender 0.0087 0.0034 -0.0093 -0.0051 -0.012 
  (0.034) (0.031) (0.034) (0.034) (0.032) 
 
Tenure  -0.0034 -0.0027 -0.0021 -0.0026 -0.0017 
  (0.0027) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0027) (0.0025) 
 
Ln (2001 Salary) 0.34 0.33 0.29 0.32 0.28 
  (0.067)*** (0.064)*** (0.060)*** (0.064)*** (0.057)*** 
 
Merit pay% 61.61 57.35   57.98 
  (5.71)*** (6.62)***   (6.60)*** 
 
Bonus Pay% -0.54  -1.07  -1.27 
  (0.95)  (0.65)  (0.94) 
 
LTI%  0.082   -1.22 -0.47 
  (1.01)   (0.96) (0.93)  
Fit Statistics 
Model Likelihood -341.50 -325.60 -331.17 -333.53 -315.73 
Sigma
2
  0.1490 0.1473 0.1478 0.1477 0.1464 
% LV-1 Var 68% 69% 69% 69% 69% 
     Explained 
Random Effects  0.0319*** 0.0229*** 0.0255*** 0.0291*** 0.0196*** 
     Variance Component 
Percent Variance  79% 95% 95% 94% 96% 
     Component Explained 
Notes: N (level-1) = 635; N (level-2) = 88. * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. For the null model, 
Sigma2 = 0.4693.  For the random intercepts model, likelihood = -624.98, Sigma
2
 = 0.3510 (25% 
explained), the random effects variance component = 0.1458 (significant at p < .001), and ICC(1) 
= 0.31. 
 
  
EVALUATING FORM AND FUNCTIONALITY OF PFP PLANS 
 
54 
TABLE 4 
Prediction of Turnover 
Variable Model 1 Model 2a Model 2b Model 2c Model 3 
For Intercept (Random Effect) 
 Intercept -1.45 -3.42 -1.90 -5.70 -2.00 
  (4.82) (4.31) (4.70) (4.63) (5.51) 
 
 PFP-Merit  -262.34   -227.10 
   (143.36)*   (115.77)* 
 
 PFP-Bonus   -2.77  92.21 
    (13.92)  (26.40)*** 
 
 PFP-LTI    -76.05 -242.17 
     (50.27)
† 
(78.77)** 
2001 Performance (linear)  
 Intercept -0.54 -0.73 -0.53
 
-1.14 -2.05 
  (0.27)* (0.27)** (0.19)** (0.48)** (0.59)*** 
 
 PFP-Merit  -823.81   -793.07 
   (223.88)***   (185.76)*** 
 
 PFP-Bonus   -30.33  21.29 
    (16.30)*  (27.15) 
 
 PFP-LTI    -162.77 -298.61 
     (88.55)* (123.49)** 
2001 Performance (Quadratic)  
 Intercept 0.71 0.64 0.60 0.20 -0.083 
  (0.25)** (0.22)** (0.21)** (0.33) (0.41) 
 
 PFP-Merit  -497.56   -332.38
 
   
(241.34)*   (253.46)
†
 
 
 PFP-Bonus   -31.67  38.69 
    (18.93)*  (43.14) 
 
 PFP-LTI    -120.65 -222.78 
     (53.87)* (86.00)** 
 
Gender 0.25 0.27 0.32 0.39 0.34 
  (0.25) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.31) 
 
Tenure  -0.088 -0.086 -0.094 -0.098 -0.095 
  (0.020)*** (0.021)*** (0.022)*** (0.022)*** (0.023)*** 
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Ln (2001 Salary) 0.023 0.20 0.070 0.39 0.020 
  (0.43) (0.39) (0.43) (0.42) (0.49) 
 
Merit pay% 11.38 31.21   23.55 
  (28.49) (23.10)   (23.16) 
 
Bonus Pay% 7.51  2.70  -1.50 
  (5.56)  (3.69)  (6.39) 
 
LTI%  -10.23   4.44 8.67 
  (8.92)   (6.31) (10.72)  
Fit Statistics 
Model Likelihood  
Sigma
2
  0.0944 0.0912 0.0939 0.0938 0.0916 
% LV-1 Var 10% 13% 11% 11% 13% 
     Explained 
Random Effects  0.3406 0.3606 0.3872 0.4063 0.1877 
     Variance Component 
Percent Variance  17% 12% 5% 1% 54% 
     Component Explained 
Notes: N (level-1) = 720; N (level-2) = 88. 
† 
p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. For the 
purpose of reporting level-1 variance explained in the turnover model, as no level-1 sigma is given 
for a dichotomous outcome, the table reports the sigma
2
 for a normal (continuous) outcome variable.  
All other turnover analyses are based on the more appropriate Bernoulli outcome model. 
 
 
 
